This case, brought by the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en Nations, was the first case since Calder et al. v. Attorney-General of British Columbia (1973, Period 7 above) in which the Supreme Court has dealt with an Aboriginal title claim. The case was sent back to trial (but never retried) due to errors made by the trial judge. The Court nonetheless laid down fundamental principles regarding the nature, content, proof, infringement, and extinguishment of Aboriginal title.
Aboriginal title is a property right, entitling the holders to exclusive possession and use of land and the resources on and under it, including trees, minerals, oil and gas. It has several sui generis or unique features: its source in occupation of land prior to Crown assertion of sovereignty and in Indigenous law; its inalienability, other than by surrender to the Crown; its communal nature; and its inherent limit. The inherent limit prevents the land from being used in ways that are incompatible with the attachment to the land that forms the basis for the Aboriginal title.
Aboriginal title can be established by proof that the land was exclusively occupied at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty. Occupation can be proven by both physical presence and Indigenous law, and needs to be evaluated in accordance with the way of life of the people in question. Two or more Indigenous nations can have joint title where they were in exclusive occupation together. Oral histories can be relied upon as evidence and have to be admitted and accorded the same respect as written documents.
Aboriginal title is one of the Aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. As such, it can only be infringed by or pursuant to legislation that meets the Sparrow test for justifiable infringement (Period 8 above), as elaborated on in R. v. Gladstone (1996).
Aboriginal title is under exclusive federal jurisdiction because it comes within the scope of "Lands reserved for the Indians" in section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (Period 5 above). For this reason, the provinces have lacked the constitutional authority to extinguish it ever since Confederation.
The Delgamuukw case also involved a claim to a right of self-government, but the Supreme Court declined to address this claim. However, by acknowledging the decision-making authority Aboriginal nations have over their communally-held Aboriginal title lands, the Court did appear to recognize the inherent right of self-government by necessary implication (see Campbell v. British Columbia, 2000).