In 1952, the Aluminum Company of Canada, with authorization from British Columbia, built a hydroelectric dam on the Nechako River, diverting a large part of the flow (see also Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010, involving the same dam). The plaintiff First Nations claim Aboriginal rights and title in the Nechako watershed. They were not consulted and did not consent to construction of the dam, which has negatively impacted their fishing rights and their way of life. They brought this action against Rio Tinto, the successor of the Aluminum Company of Canada, for nuisance and interference with their riparian rights (rights of access to and use of water from the waterways). Justice Kent made a number of findings in the plaintiffs' favour: that they met the requirements for Aboriginal title to their reserves bordering the Nechako and its tributaries (although, because other First Nations had overlapping claims, he did not issue a declaration of title); that they have Aboriginal rights to fish for food, societal, and ceremonial purposes in the Nechako River system; that the dam has had huge negative impacts on their fisheries and communities; that their Aboriginal fishing rights are a sufficient basis for a nuisance action in appropriate circumstances; and that the honour of the Crown imposes an obligation on the provincial and federal governments to protect their constitutional fishing rights. He also questioned how the Crown could have acquired sovereignty over and underlying title to Indigenous lands, simply by assertion: "Some argue, in my view correctly, that the whole construct is simply a legal fiction to justify the de facto seizure and control of the land and resources formerly owned by the original inhabitants of what is now Canada." However, he thought he had to acknowledge the reality of Crown sovereignty and follow precedents of the Supreme Court of Canada, even thought they relied on the discredited doctrine of discovery. At the end of the day, he declined to find, due to inadequate evidence, that the plaintiffs have Aboriginal title to submerged lands adjacent to their reserves or that they have riparian rights. Moreover, their tort claim in nuisance was dismissed because the company had statutory authority from the province to construct the dam. Justice Kent did not think that the doctrine of "constitutional inapplicability" applied to the nuisance claim against the company: "If actions authorized by government (whether through unconstitutional legislation, licences, or agreements, or a combination of all of these) result in harm to the plaintiffs' rights, only government must answer for that." As the plaintiffs had not claimed damages against the federal or provincial governments, the only remedy granted by the court was a declaration that those governments have a constitutional obligation to protect the plaintiffs' fishing rights, which they had not done. Justice Kent thought that, for this obligation to be met, the flow of the river had to be modified, but given his lack of expertise in regard to this matter, he did not give directions on what needed to be done to meet the obligation, nor was he willing to retain supervisory jurisdiction over implementation of a new flow regime for the river.